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BALANCING NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY: THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM'S LEGAL
DUTY TO ASYLEES FLEEING GANG VIOLENCE IN
CENTRAL AMERICA
MARGOT KNIFFIN*

I. INTRODUCTION

In September 2010, the United States government granted
asylum to Mexican journalist, Jorge Luis Arguirre.1 Arguirre began
receiving death threats two years before as he was driving to a funeral
of a fellow journalist who had been killed in gang violence. 2 At the
time, Aguirre was working as. the editor of an online newspaper in the
city of Juarez, a Mexican "epicenter" of gang violence. 3 The threats
escalated until they finally compelled him to flee his home and seek
the protection of asylum in the United States.4 Aguirre's grant of
asylum provides a new hope for Mexican journalists, one of the most
targeted professional groups fleeing Mexican gang violence. 5
However, in the wake of Aguirre's success, many immigration lawyers
and advocates are left questioning why asylum law fails to protect so
many others. As El Paso immigration lawyer, Eduardo Becket,
explains, "there is a flaw in the system ... where we're basically
saying that if you're not a famous person and a nobody, don't ask." 6
This successful asylum case is believed to be the first of its
kind since Mexican President Felipe Calder6n declared war on the
country's drug cartels in 2006. Each year since then, thousands of
individuals have come across the border with stories of death threats,
Copyright C 2011 by Margot Kniffin
*Juris Doctor Candidate 2012, University of Maryland School of Law.
1. Olga R. Rodriguez & Paul G. Weber, Threatened Mexican Journalist Receives
Asylum,

ASSOCIATED

PRESS,

Sept.

23,

2010,

available

at

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/39334585#.TqhM7Zs80ig.
2. Id.
3. Id
4. Id
5. More than 30 media workers have disappeared or been killed since President Felipe
Calderon launched his war on drug cartels in 2006. Julian Cardona, Threatened Mexican
Journalist Granted US Asylum,
REUTERS,
Sept. 21,
2010,
available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN2115054820100921?pageNumber-2v.
6. Rodriguez & Weber, supranote 1.
7. Julian Cardona,Threatened Mexican JournalistGranted US Asylum, REUTERS, Sep.
21, 2010, availableat http://www.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=USN2115054820100921.

2011]

315

DUTY To GANG VIOLENCE ASYLEES

bullet wounds, and lost family members, but only a small fraction
receive asylum in the United States. Many of these asylum seekers
come from Mexico and Central American countries and represent the
thousands of young people who have fled the violence of the Central
American gang, Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13), over the past decade.9
Born out of Los Angeles in the late 1980's, MS-13 members have a
presence in thirty-one states and have spread to El Salvador,
Guatemala and Honduras, adding to the estimated 500,000 gang
members throughout Central America.' 0 The gang, which engages in
the trafficking of illegal drugs, weapons and people, owes much of its
strength to its violent recruitment tactics of Central American youth.'
Unfortunately, despite new hope brought by Aguirre's recent success,
the majority of the individuals fleeing MS-13 will not receive the
protection of asylum once they arrive in the United States.' 2
This comment addresses how immigration judges and asylum
officers rely on biased legal standards in asylum law to systemically
exclude those fleeing gang violence in Central America. Balancing
national security concerns about increased gang activity in the United
States with an international responsibility to provide asylum to those
fleeing persecution, this comment concludes that the United States'
legal system must do more to protect the lives of individuals fleeing
gang violence. Part I discusses the historical background of MS-13, the
prominent Central American gang.13 Part II provides an overview of
asylum and the particular social group basis for relief. 14 Part II
focuses on the Board of Immigration Appeal's introduction of "social
visibility" as a defining standard of particular social group, and
critiques the Board of Immigration Appeal's use of this standard to
8. Between 2008 and 2010, US immigration courts denied asylum to 85.8% of
Mexican applicants, 88% of Guatemalan applicants, and 90.4% of El Salvadoran applicants.
Asylum Denial Rates by Nationality-Before and After the Attorney General's Directive, TRAC
IMMIGRATION, http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/240/include/nationalityalpha.html (last
visited Jan. 23, 2010).
9. Miriam Jordan, Family Seeks U.S. Asylum After Fleeing Gang, THE WALL STREET
JOURNAL,

Aug.

21,

2009,

available

at

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125081039222347885.html.
10. Freddy Funes, Removal of Central American Gang Members: How Immigration
Laws Failto Reflect Global Reality, 63 U. MIAMI L. REv. 301, 304-05 (2008).
11. Id.
12. In the El Paso Immigration Court, two of the five immigration judges have a
combined rejection rate of 83.3% for the 346 asylum cases that they adjudicated between 2006
and 2011. Julian Aguilar, Border Asylum Judges Deny Most Petitions, THE TEXAS TRIBUNE,

available
at
http://www.texastribune.org/immigration-inJuly
31,
2011,
texas/immigration/border-asylum-judges-deny-most-petitions/.
13. See infra Part I.
14. See infra Part II.
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systematically exclude those fleeing gang violence in Central
America.15 In addition, Part III demonstrates how both the Seventh
Circuit and the United Nations High Commission For Refugees have
rejected the "social visibility" standard as unworkable.1 6 Finally, Part
IV balances the count 7 's national security concerns with our
international obligations,' and Part V argues that lawmakers must take
responsibility for our country's role in the birth of the MS-13 gang and
reject the "social visibility" rejuirement to provide proper protection
to those fleeing gang violence.'
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF GANG VIOLENCE IN MEXICO AND
CENTRAL AMERICA

MS-13 and the 18th Street gang (M-18),1 9 two of Central
America's prominent street gangs, have. their earliest roots in the
streets of Los Angeles.2 0 In 1980, a violent civil war erupted in El
Salvador and, over the following twelve years, forced over 700,000 El
Salvadorans to flee to their home country.21 Of those who came to the
United States, 52% settled in downtown Los Angeles, an area which
had historically been controlled by Mexican-American gangs. 22 The
new Salvadorian refugees soon began to organize their own gangs,
such as MS-13, and also began joining existing groups, such as M-18,
to protect themselves and their families from the dominant force of the
Mexican gangs in Los Angeles.2 3
15. See infra Part III.
16. See infra Part III.
17. See infra Part IV.
18. See infra Part V.
19. Ana Arana, How the Street Gangs Took CentralAmerica, 84 FOREIGN AFF. 98, 10001 (2005) (Mara is slang for "gang," and trucha, - "trout," in Spanish - is slang for a "shrewd
person."); but see Sebastian Amar et al., Seeking Asylum from Gang-Based Violence in
Central America: A Resource Manual, CAPITAL AREA IMMIGRATION RIGHTS COAL. 1 (2007),

http://www.ailf.org/lac/GangResourceManual.pdf ("The literal meaning of Mara Salvatrucha
13 is uncertain, with different sources providing different definitions. 'Mara' is alternatively
thought to be slang for 'gang' or is thought to be a reference to a street in San Salvador.
'Salvatrucha' has been said to have roots in a slang term for street-wise Salvadoran guerillas
who fought in El Salvador's civil war, or the term for type of army ant. The '13' is usually
thought to be a reference to 13th Street in Los Angeles.").
20. Arana, supra note 19, at 100.
21. Elyse Wilkinson, Examining the Board of Immigration Appeals' Social Visibility
Requirement for Victims of Gang Violence Seeking Asylum, 62 ME. L. REV. 387, 390 (2010)
(internal citations omitted).
22. Id. at 390-91 (internal citations omitted).
23. Central American Gang-Related Asylum: A Resource Guide, WASH. OFFICE ON
LATIN AM. 2 (May 2008) [hereinafter WOLA Report].
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In the wake of the 1992 Los Angeles riots, 24 the police
concluded that the local street gangs of Salvadoran immigrants, then
only small, disorganized groups, were responsible for the majority of
the looting and criminal activity. 25 California responded by
implementing a "get tough" approach to gangs, deporting thousands of
gang members to Central American countries. 2 6 California also passed
the "three strikes" law in 1996, which resulted in another dramatic
increase in the number of incarcerated Latino immigrants.27 MS-13
and M-18 28 members were then centrally located within the California
prison system, providing an important opportunity for the gangs to
organize and gain power.
Federal immigration laws also tightened during this time,
resulting in the increased deportation of thousands of Central
American immigrants. 2 9 In 1996, Congress passed both the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act and the AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Acts, which expanded the
scope of deportable offenses under the Immigration and National Act
(INA). 30 Because the Acts applied retroactively to those convicted
before 1996, and even implicated individuals who resided in the
country as legal permanent residents, their passage resulted in the mass
deportation of young Central American criminals and their families

24. The Los Angeles riots occurred on April 29, 1992 after the four white policemen on
trial for the fatal beating of Rodney King were found innocent. The riots lasted three days,
only settling after the National Guard quelled the violence, and resulted in 52 deaths, 2,500
inures and at least $446 million in property damages. Denise DiPasquale & Edward L.
Glaeser, The Los Angeles Riot and the Economics of Urban Unrest, J. URB. EcoN. 43, 52-53
(1998).
25. Arana, supra note 19, at 100.
26. CAL. PEN. CODE § 186.22; see also Wilkinson, supra note 21, at 391.
27. Vincent Schiraldi, Jason Colburn & Erik Lotke, Three Strikes and You're Out: An
Examination of the Impact of 3 Strike Laws 10 Years After Their Enactment, JUSTICE POLICY
INSTITUTE 4 (2003) (stating that nearly two-thirds (65%) of those sentenced under California's
Three Strikes laws are imprisoned for nonviolent offenses). See also Amanda Bailey and
Joseph M. Hayes, Who's in Prison? The Changing Demographics of Incarceration, 8 CAL.
COUNTS
POPULATION
TRENDS
&
PROFILES
1, 13
(2006),
available
at
http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/cacounts/CC_806ABCC.pdf ("Thirty percent of male
prisoners were Latino in 1990; by 2005, Latinos constituted the largest ethnic group, at 37
percent.").
28. Collectively referred to as the "Mara."
29. WOLA Report, supra note 23, at 1.
30. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, Pub. L. No. 104208, §§ 321-22, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996); Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 440, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
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between 2000 and 2004.3' The majority of these deportees had settled
in the slums of Los Angeles after fleeing civil war in their countries
during the 1980's, and returned to their home countries with no
resources, homes, or connections, other than their gang ties to MS-13.
It did not take long for the returned MS-13 members to take
hold of power in El Salvador. Local governments were not stable at
this time as they were still working to rebuild following the bloody
civil war that had recently plagued the country.32 Furthermore, because
the new U.S. laws banned the disclosure of their identities, local
government officials were not aware of the potential threat that these
new arrivals presented.33 The deportations continued, however, and
MS-13 began fierce recruitment campaigns of the country's
populations of poor youth.
As MS-13 grew in power, it evolved from a territorial
organization, focused on small "cliques" (neighborhood groups), to a
more complex vertical system that allowed for communication
between groups. 34 This shift in the power structure allowed the gang's
leaders to communicate with its members while in jail and also
facilitated communication between members in Central America and
the United States. 35 It also further prevented the local governments in
El Salvador and other Central American countries from controlling the
growing strength of MS-13.
Currently, The National Civilian Police of El Salvador
estimates that there are approximately 10,500 gang members within El
Salvador's borders, and the government's National Council on Public
Security (Consejo Nacional de Seguridad Pi'blica or CNSP) calculates
31. Jonah M. Temple, The Merry-Go-Round of Youth Gangs: The Failure of the U.S.
Immigration Removal Policy and the False Outsourcing of Crime, 31 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J.
193, 196 (2011).

32. See Laura Pedraza Farifia et al., No Place to Hide: Gang, State, and Clandestine
Violence in El Salvador, HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE SERIES, 54 (2010), available at

http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/hrp/ihrc.html (follow "Previous Projects" hyperlink;
then follow "February 2010" hyperlink).
33. Temple, supra note 31, at 197 ("While communication regarding removals has
improved, some countries still do not receive any information about whether returned
nationals belong to a gang . . . Furthermore, while receiving countries are given information
regarding the specific criminal offense causing deportation, the United States does not
regularly provide full criminal records.") (internal citations omitted).
34. Juan J. Fogelbach, Gangs, Violence, and Victims in El Salvador, Guatemala, and
Honduras, 12 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 417, 422 (2010) (internal citation omitted).

35. Cara Buckley, A Fearsome Gang and Its Wannabes, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2007, at
THE

NATION

3,

available

at

http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9EOCE3DAl43 IF93AA2575BCOA9619C8B
63&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=all (stating that MS-13 groups communicate with each other,
even internationally).
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upwards of 39,000 members (22,000 in MS-13; 12,000 in M-18 and
another 5,000 in other gangs). 36 MS-13 continuously expands its
membership partly due to its fierce recruitment techniques of poor
youth.3 7 Members target young teenagers in their neighborhoods and
schools and coerce them to join the gangs through intimidation and
physical abuse. 3 8 When the targeted children refuse to join, MS-13
increases their threats on these children, or murders them to make a
statement for other attempted converts. 39
MS-13's reign of torment in El Salvador, and other Central
American countries has, in turn, forced many to flee their home and
seek refuge in the United States. El Salvadorans currently represent the
third highest nationality of immigration cases in the United States
immigration system, with 23,191 pending cases. 40 This number has
more than doubled since early 1998, when only 11,076 Salvadorans
had immigration cases in United States courts. 4 1 The increasing
number of individuals seeking refuge from gang violence in the United
States requires that the leaders and framers of the country's political
and legal systems reexamine U.S. international legal obligations to
provide protection to those fleeing persecution. In addition, it forces
the United States to reevaluate how the country's increased postSeptember 11th focus on national security prevents the country from
fulfilling these obligations to the international community.
III. ASYLUM LAW
A. Overview ofAsylum Law
Many people fleeing gang violence in Central America attempt
to gain legal status in the United States by applying for asylum. The
legal formulation of asylum arises out of the United Nations
36.

AMERICA

UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (USAID), CENTRAL

AND

MEXICO

GANG

ASSESSMENT

45

(Apr.

2006),

available

at

http://www.crin.org/docs/usaid gangassessment.pdf.
37. James Racine, Youth Resistance to Gang Recruitment as a ParticularSocial Group
in Larios v. Holder, 31 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 457, 459 (2011).
38. Michele A. Voss, Young and Marked for Death: Expanding the Definition of
"ParticularSocial Group" in Asylum Law to Include Young Victims of Gang Persecution,37
RUTGERS L.J. 235, 239 (2005) ("Many children from Central America have complained that
they cannot even perform simple daily tasks like walking to school without being harassed by
gang members trying to recruit them.").
39. Id. at 459-60.
40. Immigration

Court

Caseload

Tool,

TRAC

IMMIGRATION,

http://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/court-backlog/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2011).

41. Id.
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Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (Convention),4 2 adopted
in 1951, and the amended United Nations Protocol Relating the Status
of Refugees (Protocol), adopted on January 31, 1967.43 The United
Nations originally established the Convention in the wake of World
War II to provide international protection for those fleeing
persecution. 44 In 1980, Congress passed the 1980 Refugee Act,
conveying its intent to bring the United States into compliance with
both the Convention and the Protocol.45
Because the United States has agreed to comply with the
provisions of the United Nations Protocol, the legal standards for
asylum are now included in the INA.46 Under the INA, an individual
may qualify for asylum if he or she is:
Any person who is outside any country of such person's
nationality ... and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is
unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that
country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution
on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group, or political opinion.4 7
Therefore, in order to gain asylum, a person must convincingly
show that: (1) he or she experienced past persecution/or has a wellfounded fear of future persecution; (2) the government is unable or
unwilling to protect him or her from that persecution; (3) he or she
would not be able to re-locate within the country to avoid persecution
in his or her country; and (4) he or she has been persecuted because of
either his or her race, religion, nationality, political opinion or
membership in a particular social group. 48 Because asylum is
discretionary, the immigration judge will also base his or her decision
on the perceived credibility of the respondent. 49

42. Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19
U.S.T. 6259, available at http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aal0.html [hereinafter Convention].
43. Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 606
U.N.T.S. 267, availableat http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aal0.html [hereinafter Protocol].
44. Chantal Marie-Jeanne Bostock, The International Legal Obligations Owed to the
Asylum Seekers On the MV Tampa, 14 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 279, 282 (2002) (internal citations
omitted).
45. I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 436-37 (1987) (citing H.R. No. 96-608 at
9 (1979)).
46. 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(42)(A) (2006).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at § 1158(b)(1)(B).
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An applicant can either make an affirmative or a defensive
application for asylum.5 0 For an affirmative application, the applicant
must be present in the United States and initiate his or her own
application for asylum with an asylum officer. 5 ' An individual will
have a defensive application if he or she is placed in removal
proceedings after being found ineligible for asylum by an asylum
officer, after being apprehended in the United States without proper
legal documents, or after being caught by U.S. Customs or Border
Protection while trying to enter the United States without proper
documentation. 52 In both forms of asylum applications, the respondent
has the burden of proving his or her eligibility for asylum.5 3
In an affirmative application, an asylum officer will first
conduct an asylum interview with the applicant and will then choose to
admit or deny the applicant.54 Between 2000 and 2004, only 19% of all
affirmative asylum applications were approved by asylum officers.5 5 If
the asylum officer denies the applicant, the officer will defer the
applicant to the Department of Justice, which will place the applicant
in defensive proceedings before an Immigration Judge. 56 Because the
defensive asylum application process is adversarial and takes place in
immigration court, the respondent has the opportunity to prepare
evidence, witnesses and cross-examination. 57 From 2001-2005, almost
50. See Obtaining Asylum in the United States, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION

SERVICES
(Mar.
10,
2011),
http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.5af9bb95919f35e66f614176543f6dla/?vgnex
toid=dab9fO67e318321OVgnVCMl00000082ca6aRCRD&vgnextchannel=f39d3e4d77d7321
OVgnVCM1 00000082ca6OaRCRD [hereinafter ObtainingAsylum].
5 1. Id.
52. See id (explaining the multiples processes through which individuals are "generally
placed" in defensive asylum proceedings).
53. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.5, 242.17(c) (1984); In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 215 (BA
1985) (holding that the Respondent has the burden of establishing support his claim by a
preponderance of the evidence).
54. See The Affirmative Asylum Process, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES

(Mar.
10,
2011),
http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.5af9bb95919f35e66f614176543f6dla/?vgnex
toid=888el8alf8b7321OVgnVCMIO0000082ca6OaRCRD&vgnextchannel=f39d3e4d77d7321
OVgnVCM1OOOOO82ca6OaRCRD.
55. The

Asylum

Process,

TRAC

IMMIGRATION,

http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/159/ (last visited Dec. 18, 2011) [Hereinafter The
Asylum Process].
56. See Types ofAsylum Decisions,U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES (Mar.

15,
2011),
http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.5af9bb95919f35e66f614176543f6dl a/?vgnex
toid-4a49549bf06832 1OVgnVCM 100000082ca6aRCRD&vgnextchannel=f39d3e4d77d7321
OVgnVCM 100000082ca6OaRCRD.
57. ObtainingAsylum, supra note 50.
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311,000 respondents filed defensive asylum applicants in immigration
courts. 8 About 71% of these applicants entered the process as referrals
from asylum officers, because they had previously filed an affirmative
application, while 29% of the respondents entered because they were
in removal proceedings and pled to asylum as an affirmative defense.5 9
Of the latter group of applicants, only 19.8% were granted asylum. 60
If the immigration court denies the respondent's application, he
or she can appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). The
BIA is a fifteen member administrative body that is appointed by the
Attorney General. 6 1 The BIA generally conducts a "paper review" of
the case, rather than courtroom proceedings.62 BIA decisions are
binding on all immigration judges and Department of Homeland
Security Officers, unless modified or overruled by the Attorney
General or a federal court. 63 If the BIA denies asylum, the respondent
can then appeal the decision to the federal court of appeals in which
the individual resides.
B. The ParticularSocial Group ProtectedGround
Because many individuals fleeing MS-13 cannot demonstrate
that they suffered persecution due to their race, religion, nationality or
political opinion, most attempt to base their asylum claim on their
membership in a particularsocial group.64 Particular social group is
one of the five Frotected grounds on which an individual can base an
asylum claim,
by demonstrating a nexus between the past
persecution that the individual suffered (or his or her fear of future
persecution) and his or her membership in this group. 66 The particular
58. The Asylum Process,supra note 55.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS, http://www.justice.gov/eoir/fs/biabios.htm (last
visited Nov. 25, 2011) [Hereinafter Board of Immigration Appeals]; 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(a)(1)
(2009) ("The Board members shall be attorneys appointed by the Attorney General to act as
the Attorney General's delegates in the cases that come before them.").
62. Board oflmmigrationAppeals, supra note 61.
63. Board oflmmigrationAppeals, supra note 61.
64. See, e.g., In re Acosta, 19. 1.& N. Dec. 211, 213, 232 (BIA 1985).
65. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2006).
66. I.N.S. v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 482 (1992) (emphasizing that the persecution
suffered must be "on account of' the political opinion of the victim). E.g., Tapiero de Orejuela
v. Gonzalez, 423 F.3d 666, 672 (7th Cir. 2005) (finding that the "educated, landowning class"
constituted a particular social group); Matter of Kasinga, 21 1. & N. Dec. 357 (BIA 1996)
(finding that "young women of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe who have not had female genital
mutilation, as practiced by that tribe, and who oppose the practice" qualified as a particular
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social group protected ground came directly from the 1967 Protocol,67
however it was added as an afterthought to the list of protected
grounds.'6 Although there is no statutory definition of particular social
group, the Office of the United Nations High Commission of
Refugees' (UNHCR's) "Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for
Determining Refugee Status," under the 1951 Convention and the
1967 Protocol, provides some insight into the Congressional intent
behind the inclusion of this category.69 The handbook states that
membership in a particular social group "comprises persons of similar
background, habits or social status." 70
In 1984, the BIA first defined the particular social group
category in Matter of Acosta.71 The BIA based its analysis on the
doctrine of ejusdem generis ("of the same kind") to determine that if
"words used in enumeration with specific words should be construed
in a manner consistent with the specific words," and reasoned that it
should look to the nature of the other four grounds for asylum (race,
religion, nationality, and political opinion) to establish a working
definition of particular social group. Examining the other grounds,
the court concluded that "[e]ach of these grounds describes
persecution aimed at an immutable characteristic: a characteristic that
either is beyond the power of an individual to change or is so
fundamental to individual identity or conscience that it ought not be
required to be changed." 73 The BIA then held that persecution based
on membership in a particular social group means that a person is the
victim of persecution because he or she belongs to a group of people
who share a "common, immutable characteristic." 74
In the years following the Acosta decision, the federal circuits
split on how they chose to interpret the BIA's "immutability"
characterization of particular social group. 75 The First, Third, Sixth,

social group); Malonga v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 546 (8th Cir. 2008) (concluding that Lari ethnic
group of the Kongo tribe is a particular social group).
67. Id. at 232; Protocol,supra note 43.
68. Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 232.
69. UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES (UNHCR), HANDBOOK ON
PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS UNDER THE 1951 CONVENTION

AND THE 1967 PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES

§ 77

at http://www.unhcr.org/3d58el3b4.html.
70. Id.
71. In re Acosta, 19. I. & N. Dec. 211, 213, 233 (BIA 1985).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Voss, supra note 38, at 251-52.

(Rev. 1 1992), available
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and Seventh Circuits adopted the definition set forth in Acosta. 76 The
Ninth Circuit, in addition, rooted its definition of immutability in the
"voluntary associational relationship among the purported members,"
described as a "collection of people closely affiliated with each other,
who are actuated by some common impulse or interest." 77 The Second
Circuit, in turn, followed the Ninth Circuit's "voluntary associational
relationship," while also adding that members of the particular social
group must be "recognizable and discrete."78 The definition of
particular social group continues to evolve, as the BIA and circuit
courts shift their conception of its underlying elements. The next
section will examine one particular criteria of particular social group,
"social visibility," which the courts have wielded to construct an
insurmountable wall to asylum for those fleeing gang violence.7 9
IV. THE INTRODUCTION OF "SOCIAL VISIBILITY" AS A DEFINING
CHARACTERISTIC OF PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP

A. The BIA Introduces "Social Visibility"
In the 2006 case, In re C-A, 80 the BIA introduced yet another
requisite element of the particular social group protected ground for
asylum: "social visibility."8 1 Establishing the purpose of this
requirement, the BIA stated that the existence of a claimed particular
social group must be objectively recognizable by "others in the
country in question" in order for an individual to reasonably suffer

76. See Castellano-Chacon v. I.N.S., 341 F.3d 533, 546, 549 (6th Cir. 2003) (applying
Acosta to find that "tattooed youth" are not a particular social group); Lwin v. I.N.S., 144 F.3d
505, 512 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that parents of Burmese student dissidents shared a
common, immutable characteristic and defined a particular social group); Fatin v. I.N.S., 12
F.3d 1233, 1241 (3rd Cir. 1993) (holding that a subgroup of Iranian feminists who refuse to
conform to the government's gender-specific laws and social norms may constitute a particular
social group); Ananch-Firempong v. I.N.S., 766 F.2d 621, 626 (1st Cir. 1985) (applying
Acosta in order to conclude that family characteristics can define a particular social group).
77. Sanchez-Trujillo v. I.N.S., 801 F.2d 1571, 1576 (9th Cir. 1986); Hernandez-Montiel
v. I.N.S., 225 3d. 1084, 1093 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that a particular social group is "one
united by a voluntary association . . . or by an innate characteristic that is so fundamental to
the identities or consciences of its members that members either cannot or should not be
required to change it") (internal citation omitted).
78. Gomez v. I.N.S., 947 F.2d 660, 664 (9th Cir. 1991) ("Like the traits which
distinguish the other four enumerated categories-race, religion, nationality and political
opinion-the attributes of a particular social group must be recognizable and discrete.").
79. See infra Part III.
80. 23 1. & N. Dec. 951 (BIA 2006).
81. Id.at959-61
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persecution on account of membership in that group. 82 The respondent
in In re C-A- was a bakery owner from Cali, Colombia, which was the
home of the Cali drug cartel at that time.8 Although the respondent
himself was not involved in cartel activity, a friend of the respondent
his would often visit the respondent's bakery and talk openly about
this friend's involvement with the drug cartels. 84 The respondent then
passed this information on to the general counsel for the city, who was
responsible for prosecuting drug traffickers. 8 5 Following his decision
to pass. along this information, various members of the drug cartels
threatened the respondent and made numerous attempts to kill him,
forcing the respondent to eventually flee to the United States. 8 6
As the basis for the respondent's asylum claim, he stated that
he was a member of the particular social group "noncriminal drug
informants working against the Cali drug cartel" and asserted that this
qualified as a group with an immutable characteristic under Acosta.87
In response, the BIA recognized that this group could be viewed as
immutable because the respondent was not able to change his past
decision to act as an informant.8 8 However, the BIA concluded that the
respondent took a calculated risk when he made the decision to act as
an informant and was therefore not in a position to claim refugee
status. 89
In addition to immutability, the BIA looked to the
characterization of "social visibility" to determine whether the
respondent qualified for asylum. 90 The Court reasoned that to
determine the existence of a claimed group, it had often looked to the
extent to which members of a claimed group would be recognizable to
those outside of the group. 9 1 In doing so, the BIA referenced its 1996
decision, In re H-,9 where it determined that the distinct linguistic
commonalities of a Somali sub-clan helped to qualify the sub-clan as a

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id.
Id. at 952.
Id.
Id.
In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 952-53 (BIA 2006).
Id. at 957-58.
Id. at 958.
Id. at 959.

90. Id
91. Id. at 960 ("Our other decisions recognizing particular social groups involved
characteristics that were highly visible and recognizable by others in the country in
question.").
92. In re H-, 21 1. & N. Dec. 337 (BIA 1996).
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particular social group. 93 The BIA also looked to the UNHCR
Guidelines, which state that "persecutory action toward a group may
be a relevant factor in determining the visibility of a group in a
particular society." 94 Applying this standard, the BIA denied asylum to
the respondent partially because general members of society would not
recognize the respondent as an informant of the Cali drug cartel.9 5
Two years later, the BIA again applied the "social visibility"
standard to a Salvadoran gang-based asylum claim in Matter of S-EG.96 The respondent in this case was a teenage girl who received
continuous threats from MS-13 and applied for asylum under the
particular social group of "young Salvadorans who have been subject
to recruitment efforts by criminal gangs, but who have refused to join
for personal, religious, or moral reasons." 97 When the respondent
refused to join the gang, members of MS- 13 threatened to rape her and
then murdered a child in the neighborhood who also refused to join
them.98 To evaluate the asylum claim, the BIA heard expert testimony
from a professor at Central American University, who informed the
court that the police in the country were unable to control MS-13
because the gang had too much influence in the local government. 99
The expert testimony, however, had little impact on the BIA's
analysis of the claim.100 The BIA focused its analysis on the "social
visibility" requirement that it established in In re C-A-.1ot Examining
the claim in this light, the BIA concluded that neither MS-13, nor
society at large, would be able to distinguish the claimed group from
any other individuals in the general population.1 02 Because the gang
violence was so widespread, the court reasoned the claimed particular
social group was exposed to the same degree of violence as the rest of
those living in the country.103

93. In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 959.
94. Id.

at 960

(quoting UNHCR,

GUIDELINES ON INTERNATIONAL

PROTECTION:

"MEMBERSHIP OF A PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP" WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF ARTICLE IA(2) OF
THE 1951 CONVENTION AND ITS 1967 PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES, at

14, U.N.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Doc. HCR/GIP/02/02 (May 7, 2002)).
Id.
In re S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579 (BIA 2008).
Id. at 588.
Id. at 580.
Id.
See id at 582.
Id
In re S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 588 (BIA 2008).
Id. at 587.
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By rejecting the respondent's claimed particular social group
based on the conclusion that the Central American youth fleeing gang
violence failed to meet the "social visibility" requirement, the BIA
created a potentially insurnountable hurdle for future gang based
asylum claims; in the years since Matter of S-E-G-, the BIA has
repeatedly reaffirmed this holding by denying subsequent claims of
this kind. 104 Furthermore, many circuit courts have followed suit,
adopting the BIA's conclusion that resisting the violence of a Central
American gangs does not place one within the protected ground of a
particular social group.10 5 As such, the BIA's holding in Matter of S-EG- has effectively shut the doors of the courthouse to all of the others
fleeing the violence of MS-13 in El Salvador, and other Central
American countries. 1 06
B. The Seventh Circuitand the UNHCR Condemn the "Social
Visibility " Standard
The BIA's focus on "social visibility" has since been met with
resistance by the Seventh Circuit and the United Nations High
Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). In its recent decision, Gatimi v.
Holder, the Seventh Circuit concluded that "social visibility" is not a
workable standard because the BIA has failed to apply it consistently
throughout its decisions, and because it does reflect the reality of how
104. Matter of E-A-G-, 21 1. & N. Dec. 591, 594 (BIA 2008) (holding that Honduran
males who resisted gang recruitment did not constitute a particular social group because this
groups "lacks the social visibility that would allow others to identify its members as part of
such a group").
105. E.g. Rivera Barrientos v. Holder, 658 F.3d 1222, 1235 (10th Cir. 2011) (holding that
"El Salvadoran women between ages of 12 and 25 who resisted gang recruitment" did not
meet the BIA's social visibility requirement, and therefore denying the petition's asylum
claim); Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Attorney General of U.S.. 2011 WL 5345436, *14 -*15 (3rd
Cir. 2011) (acknowledging the BIA's "social visibility requirement, but remanding the
decision on other grounds); Mendez-Barrera v. Holder. 602 F.3d 21, 27 (1st Cir. 2010)
(rejecting petitioner's asylum claim based on the finding that "young women recruited by
gang members who resist such recruitment" was not socially visible); Vasquez v. Holder, 343
Fed.Appx. 681, 683-83 (2d. Cir. 2009) (deferring to the BIA's holding in Matter of S-E-Gand holding that the group, "individuals who have been actively recruited by gangs, but who
have refused to join because they oppose the gangs," fails to meet the "social visibility"
requirement of particular social group); Santos-Lemus v. Mukasey, 542 F.3d 738, 745-46 (9th
Cir. 2008) (describing the BIA's analysis in Matter of S-E-G- as "particularly helpful" and
finding that the particular social group, "young men in El Salvador resisting gang violence"
failed to qualify as a particular social group due to its lack of social visibility); SanchezTrujillo v. INS, 542 F.3d 738, 745-46 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding that the group of "young
Salvadorans who had refused to accede to gang recruitment" lacked the requisite "social
visibility" to qualify as a particular social group).
106. Id.
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asylum applicants are forced to adapt to persecution in their countries
of origin.107 Furthermore, in a recent amicus brief, the UNHCR
claimed the BIA misread the UNHCR guidelines when it held that an
individual must be objectively visible to the general society to meet
the particular social group requirement.10 8
1. The Seventh Circuit Rejects "Social Visibility" as a
Workable Standard for Determining Particular Social
Group
In Gatimi, Judge Posner, writing for the Seventh Circuit,
addressed the inconsistencies within the BIA's "social visibility"
standard.109 The respondent in Gatimi was a former member of a tribe
in Kenya, whose members were threatening his life. 0 The BIA denied
his asylum claim, based on his failure to meet the "social visibility"
standard of particular social group."' The BIA concluded that there
was no evidence that Gatimi "possesse[d] any characteristics that
would cause others in Kenyan society to recognize him as a former
member of [the tribe]."ll 2
Examining the BIA's application of the "social visibility"
standard on appeal, Posner advanced two reasons why the "social
visibility" requirement "makes no sense."1 1 3 First, Posner stated that
the BIA has failed to apply the "social visibility" requirement evenly
to all cases. 114 Specifically, Posner discussed a line of cases in which
the BIA did not mention the "social visibility" standard when
determining particular social group." 5 These cases included In re
Kasinga, where the BIA found that the group, "young women of a
tribe that practices female genital mutilation but who have not been
subjected to it,"ll6 qualified as a particular social group, and In re
Toboso-Alfonso, in which the BIA found that the group,
"homosexuals,"ll 7 constituted a particular social group."' In this line
107. Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611, 615 (7th Cir. 2009).
108. See Brief of United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioner at 14, Gaitan v. Holder, No. 10-1724 (8th Cir. argued May 12, 2011),
at
http://www.ilcm.org/documents/litigationseg/8CA 10 1724_Granadosavailable
Gaitan vHolderamicus UNHCR.pdf. [hereinafter UNHCR Brie]].
109. Gatimi, 578 F.3d at 615.
110. Id. at 614.
111. Id.at615.
112. Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611, 615 (7th Cir. 2009).
113. Id
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 615 (citing In re Kasinga, 21 1. & N. Dec. 357, 366 (BIA 1996)).
117. Id. at 615 (citing In re Toboso-Alfonso, 20 1.& N. Dec. 819, 822-23 (BIA 1990)).
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of cases, the BIA found that a particular social group existed without
applying the "social visibility" analysis that it applied in Gatimi.119
Posner concluded that this inconsistency on the part of the BIA raised
questions about the rationale behind enforcing a "social visibility"
standard for the particular social group requirement.
Second, Posner acknowledged that the standard does not make
sense because individuals facing the threat of persecution will "take
pains to avoid being socially visible."1 20 For example, Posner pointed
out that homosexuals in a homophobic society will attempt to pass as
heterosexual in order to avoid persecution.121 These efforts will
prevent the persecuted individuals from being visible to the general
society. In this way, Posner illustrated that the BIA's "social visibility"
standard places an unreasonable and unrealistic burden on the asylum
applicant; it demands that the applicant place himself in increased
danger by making himself more visible to the general society in order
to be eligible for asylum in the United States.12
2. The United Nations High Commission For Refugees Rejects
the BIA 's "Social Visibility" Standard
On July 14, 2010, the UNHCR filed an amicus brief in the
Eighth Circuit case Granados-Gaitan v. Holder, an El Salvadoran
gang case, urging the Eight Circuit to reject Matter of S-E-G- and the
BIA's "social visibility" claim as inconsistent with both Matter of
Acosta and the UNHCR's own guidelines.123 In its amicus brief, the
UNHCR explained that the BIA misread the UNHCR guidelines in
both Matter of C-A- and Matter of S-E-G-.1 24 The UNHCR claimed
that it has set forth two dominant approaches for defining social group:
"protected characteristics" and "social perception." 1 2 The first of
these approaches, which the BIA embodied in the Acosta decision, 12 6
118. See also In re Fuentes, 19 I. & N. Dec. 658, 662 (BIA 1996) (former members of the
national police are a particular social group).
119. Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611,615-16 (7th Cir. 2009).
120. Id. at 615.
121.

Id.

122. See id. ("If you are a member of a group that has been targeted for assassination or
torture or some other mode of persecution, you will take pains to avoid being socially visible;
and to the extent that the members of the target group are successful in remaining invisible,
they will not be 'seen' by other people in the society 'as a segment of the population."').
123. UNHCR Brief supra note 108, at 4 (explaining that the requirement of "social
visibility" to identify a social group does not reflect the "text, context or object and purpose"
of the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol).
124. UNHCR Brief,supra note 108, at 15.
125. UNHCR Brief supranote 108, at 4 5.
126. See In re Acosta, 19 1. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (BIA 1985).
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assessed an innate and unchangeable characteristic of the group.127 The
second approach, "social perception," examined whether or not
members of a group share a common characteristic which makes them
a cognizable group, or sets them apart from the society at large. 28In
an attempt to reconcile these two approaches, the UNHCR developed a
definition of particular group that recognized both definitions.1 29
In its amicus brief, however, the UNHCR explained that these
tests are separate and alternative.130 The first step for determining
particular social group is to examine whether the shared characteristic
is immutable and fundamental.13 ' If the first step is not met, the
adjudicator can then look to the second "social perception" prong to
determine whether the group is nonetheless perceived by society as a
cognizable group. 132 Therefore, the second step only plays a role in
the determination of particular social group if the first step cannot be
met.
The UNHCR concluded that the BIA misread the guidelines,
clarifying that "social perception" does not require "visibility," and
that there is no requirement that a particular social group be visible to
the society at large.133 Instead, the purpose of the "social perception"
requirement is to establish whether the members of the group share a
characteristic that distinguishes them from the general society. 134 This
analysis does not equate to the BIA's holding that the members must
be identifiable to an objective party or to the general society. Although
the UNHCR guidelines address visibility, stating that "[p]ersecutory
action toward a group may be a relevant factor in determining the
visibility of a group," s this description is only meant to illustrate how

127. UNHCR, GUIDELINES ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION: "MEMBERSHIP IN A
PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP," WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF ARTICLE IA(2) OF THE 1951
CONVENTION RELATING THE STATUS OF REFUGEES, at
6, U.N. Doc. HCR/GIP/02/02 (May 7,

1

2002) [hereinafter UNHCR Guidelines].
128. Id. at 7. Australia is the only common law country to use this approach, which was
established by the High Court of Australia in, Applicant A and Another v. Minister for
Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1997) 190 CLR 225 (Austl.); UNHCR Brief supra note 108,
at 11.
129. Id at I 11 (noting that "a particular social group is a group of person who share a
common characteristic other than their risk of being persecuted, or who are perceived as a
group by society. The characteristic will often be one which is innate, unchangeable, or which
is otherwise fundamental to identity, conscience or the exercise of one's human rights.").
130. UNHCR Brief,supra note 108, at 4-5.
131. UNHCR Brief,supra note 108, at 4-5.
132. UNHCR Brief,supra note 108, at 13.
133. UNHCR Brief,supra note 108, at 13.
134. UNHCR Brief supra note 108, at 14.
135. UNHCR Guidelines, supra note 127, at $ 14.
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a group can be set apart because it is being targeted. 136 Based on these
findings, the UNHCR brief thereby urged the BIA to reevaluate this
standard in light on the underlying purpose of Commission's
guidelines, as well as the court's obligations to the International
standards for the protection of refugees.137
V. WHAT IS OUR RESPONSIBILITY?

Taking a step back from the legal framework that successfully
thwarts so many gang-based asylum claims in the United States, it is
also essential to consider the social and political forces that inherently
influence judicial decisions and legal standards.1 38 Immigration law
does not exist in a vacuum, and instead is shaped by the realities of
political influence, 13 9 as well as the imperfections of an overburdened
court system.140 Specifically, a recent surge in MS-13 related violence
within our borders has incited many to argue that current threats to
national security call for the tightening of restrictions on immigration
from Mexico and Central America, rather than increasing the
availability of legal status to individuals from this region.141 In one
example of this violence, Juan Carlos Moreira was sentenced to life in
prison by the U.S. District Court of Maryland, in September 2010.142
According to his own verbal statements, Moreira was responsible for
four bloody murders, which occurred between January 1, 2003 and
January 5, 2005.143 A native of El Salvador, Moreira came to the
United States illegally in the summer of 2000 and helped found the
Sailor Locos Salvatruchos Westside (SLSW), a MS-13 clique in Silver

136.
137.
138.
139.

UNHCR Brief supra note 108, at 15.
UNHCR Brief,supra note 108, at 28.
See supra Part III.
See infra Part IV.C.

140. Immigration Case Backlog Still Growing in FY 2011, TRAC IMMIGRATION, Feb. 7,

2011, http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/246/ ("The number of cases awaiting resolution
before the Immigration Courts reached a new all-time high of 267,752 by the end of December
2010 . .. [t]he case backlog has continued to grow - up 2.6 percent - since Trac's last report
three months ago, and more than a third higher (44%) than levels at the end of FY 2008.").
141. Associated Press, Texas Rep. Callsfor ImmigrationReform, Tighter BorderSecurity
in
Congressional
Hearing,
FoxNEws.CoM
(Sept.
19,
2011),
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/09/19/texas-rep-calls-for-immigration-reform-bordersecurity-in-congressional-hearing/.
142. Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice Office of Public Affairs - Baltimore Division,
MS-13 Gang Leader Sentenced to Life in Prison for Racketeering Offenses Including the
at
14,
2010),
available
of
a
Witness
(Sept.
Murder
http://baltimore.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrell0/ba091410.htm.
143. Id.
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Spring, Maryland. 144 These murders are just a snapshot of the MS-13
driven violence in Maryland, and across the country. 14 5
These MS-13 related murders, along with many others, raise
important questions about whether the United States bears the
responsibility for providing asylum to victims of a gang that currently
pose an increasing national security concern within our own borders.
These questions also come at a time where the numbers of backlogged
federal immigration court cases are rapidly increasing, 14 6 and
immigration judges must face the daily challenge of evaluating and
parsing fraudulent asylum claims.147 Due to the challenge of parsing
the authentic gang-based asylum claims from the fraudulent claims of
potential gang members, the courts have reacted by conflating all
claims and building insurmountable legal hurdles, such as the "social
visibility" requirement, that prevent the vast majority of Central
American gang-based asylum claims from obtaining protection.148
Currently, the Courts' solution weighs heavily in favor of national
security concerns, 14 9 while ignoring the country's international
obligation to provide protection to individuals fleeing persecution.' 50
To strike a new balance, advocates and lawmakers must
reexamine the original purpose of the asylum laws, take responsibility
for the U.S.'s role in the creation of MS-13, and develop creative
solutions for providing safe options to those seeking safety within our
borders. Part A of this section provides an overview of the present

144. Id.
145. See Ruben Castaneda, Witness Tells Court About Gang-Rape in MS-13 Trial,
WASHINGTON POST, Sept. 29, 2006, at B2, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/09/28/AR2006092801680.html?referrer-emailarticle (describing the
gang rape of a 16 year-old high school student at the hands of MS-13 members); Man
Sentenced to Life for New Jersey Schoolyard Killings, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 4, 2010,
available at http://abclocal.go.com/wabc/story?section-news/local&id=7764823 (stating that
a MS- 13 member was sentenced to three consecutive life sentences after pleading guilty to the
execution style killing of three college students).
146. See supra note 140.
147. See Sam Dolnick, Immigrants May be Fed False Stories to Bolster Asylum Pleas,
N.Y.
TIMES,
July
11,
2011,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/12/nyregion/immigrants-may-be-fed-false-stories-tobolster-asylumpleas.html? r-1&scp=1&sq=Immigrants%2OMay%20be%2OFed%2OFalse%2OStories%20to
%20Bolster/o2OAsylum%20Pleas&st=cse; see also Jesse Ellison, Why the DSK Maid Lied,
THE

DAILY

BEAST,

July

7,

http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2011/07/07/dominique-strauss-kahn-accuser-whylying-on-asylum-filing-doesn-t-mean-she-s-a-liar.html.
148. See supra Part II, Part III.
149. See infra Part W.A.
150. See infra Part IV.B.
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threat the MS-13 poses to the country's national security.15 1
Developing a realistic understanding of this threat is an essential
element of finding a true balance with the country's responsibility to
non-citizens seeking asylum under the UNHCR Convention and
Protocol,described in Part B.152 Part C then contrasts the politicization
of asylum adjudication throughout U.S. history with the politically
neutral objectives of the UNHCR Convention and the Protocol, and
argues that the BIA's "social visibilitj" standard is another example of
a politically biased legal standard.' Finally, Part V of the comment
proposes suggestions for addressing the current imbalance.' 54
A. MS-13's Threat to NationalSecurity
Evaluating the extent of the threat that MS-13 poses in the
United States is a crucial step in determining how to best protect the
interests of both asylees and American citizens. A recent surge in MS13 related murders has led the Department of Homeland Security to
define gang activities as a threat to our national security.' 5 5 According
to a 2008 threat assessment, the FBI determined that MS-13 operates
in forty-two states and the District of Columbia, and it has a
nationwide membership of about 6,000-10,000 people.1 56 In addition,
researchers categorize MS-13 as a transnational threat, meaning that
gang members commit crimes that gang leaders plan and control in
more than one country.15 7 Others describe the threat of transnational
gangs, like MS-13, as "very mobile, highly adaptable to new
geographic areas, and maintaining connections in their native
countries." 15 8
The FBI and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) have
established various programs to help combat the spread of MS-13
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

See infra Part IV.A.
See infra Part IV.B.
See infra Part IV.C.
See infra Part V.
Brett Wolf, DHS Surge Shows National Security Threat Posed By Transnational

Street Gangs; ICE Struggles with Lasting Solution, HOMELAND SECURITY OUTLOOK (Jan. 26,

2011),
http://www.hsoutlook.com/features/features/1 21 -dhs-surge-shows-national-securitythreat-posed-by-transnational-street-gangs-ice-struggles-with-lasting-solution-.html.
156. The MS-13 Threat, A National Assessment, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,

Jan. 14, 2008, http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2008/january/msl3_011408 [hereinafter FBI].
157. CELINDA FRANCO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE MS-13 AND 18T STREET GANGS:
EMERGING TRANSNATIONAL GANG THREATS? 7 (2010).

158. Id. at 5 (quoting CLAUDE ARNOLD, U.S. I.C.E. HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATORS AND
PUBLIC SAFETY OFFICE, IMMIGRATION AUTHORITIES AND GANG ENFORCEMENT, UNITED STATES

ATTORNEYS' BULLETIN 42 (2006)).
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activity within the United States. In 2004, the FBI established the
National Gang Task Forces (NGTF) to coordinate state and federal
efforts to target MS-13 members.' 5 9 In 2005, Congress also provided
funding (pursuant to P.L. 108-447) for a National Gang and
Intelligence Center (NGIC) to centralize information on gangs and
disseminate it with local law enforcement throughout the country.160
More recently, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has
initiated programs, such as Operation Community Shield, which
partner with local law enforcement agencies to target foreign-born
gang members.161
B. An Obligation to the UnitedNations Convention
Despite the increased MS-13 activity in the past years,
lawmakers must consider national security concerns in the context of
the country's obligation to international conventions regarding the
protection and safety of refugees. As discussed in Part II, Congress
demonstrated its commitment to bringing the United States into
compliance with the Convention and the Protocol when it passed the
1980 Refugee Act.162 The Supreme Court also recognized this
Congressional intent in INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, stating that "one of
Congress' primary purposes in passing the Refugee Act was to
implement the principles agreed to in the 1967 United Nations
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees ... to which the United

States acceded in 1968.",163 Furthermore, Article VI of the U.S.
Constitution states that treaties that the United States has acceded to
"shall be the supreme [1]aw of the [1]and."l 64 As the UNHCR noted, to
fulfill this obligation, "Congress provided a path for refugees to seek
asylum in the U.S." through 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42), so that refugees
could escape persecution in their country of origin. 16 The U.S.
adoption of the Convention and Protocol, and the subsequent
confirmation of the country's obligation to these treaties by the
159. Id at 9.
160. Id at 11.
161. ICE Arrests 30 Men in Milwaukee During ICE-led Anti-Gang Operation,
at
1,
2011,
available
MMDNEWSWIRE,
Aug.
http://finance.sfgate.com/hearst.sfgate/news/read/19115686/ice arrests 30_men-in-milwauke
eduringice.
162. I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 436-37 (1987) (internal citations omitted).
163. I.N.S. v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 427 (1999) (citing I.N.S. v. CardozaFonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 436-37 (1986)).
164. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, Cl. 2.
165. UNHCR Brief supra note 108, at 8.
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Supreme Court, therefore requires that the United States takes
proactive steps in creating a path to asylum. By ignoring these
responsibilities, without attempting to strike an affirmative balance
with national concerns, the United States is shirking its international
duties to all individuals fleeing persecution in their countries of origin.
C. Variationsfrom the UnitedNations Convention and the
PoliticizationofAsylum Law in the United States
Lawmakers have yet to fulfill this commitment of bringing the
United States into compliance with the Convention and Protocol,
however, as apparent variations still exist between current United
States asylum policies and the humanitarian, non-discriminatory
language of the original United Nations documents.' 66 These
variations illustrate how the United States' political relationships with
specific countries still affect our asylum system's treatment of those
entering the United States.' 6 7 The impact of foreign policy on asylum
law is not a new phenomenon in the United States, and during the
1980's, many commentators addressed the system's historic bias
towards those individuals fleeing our nation's enemies in the Cold
War.1 68
For example, in her article, The Politicization of United States
Asylum and Refugee Policies, Victoria Rapoport finds a parallel
between the United States' historical disapproval of communist
regimes and high asylum grant rates from communist (or former
communist) countries, such as Cuba and China.169 Although the
Republic of Cuba has only eleven million citizens, individuals arriving
from Cuba made up 7.6% of the refugee grants in 2006.170 On the
contrary, Rapoport finds that adjudicators grant a low rate of asylum
applications to individuals fleeing countries with which the United
166. Victoria Rapoport, The Politicizationof United States Asylum and Refugee Policies,
195, 203-04 (2009).
167. Id. at 204.
168. Daniel L. Swanwick, Foreign Policy and Humanitarian in U.S. Asylum
Adjudication: Revisiting the Debate in the Wake of the War on Terror, 21 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.
129, 131 (2006). Others argue that asylum has no inherent humanitarian value and point to
asylum's ancient Greek roots to demonstrate that the concept has always maintained a
primarily political purpose. Mathew E. Price, Politics or Humanitarianism? Recovering the
Political Roots of Asylum, 19 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J., 277, 286 (2004) (noting "[a] decision to
shelter a fugitive would be interpreted as an affront to the foreign power and could sometimes
precipitate war, while a refusal to grant asylum was impious and could be construed as a sign
of political weakness").
169. Rapoport, supra note 166, at 221-22 (internal citation omitted).
170. Id. at 222 (internal citations omitted).
11
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States has a strategically strong economic or military relationship, such
as Saudi Arabia. In 2006, the United States granted asylum to only a
few applicants from Saudi Arabia, despite the fact that Saudi Arabia
maintains similarly high rates of human rights violations.172
Despite governmental reforms aimed at "applying a single
standard of asylum eligibility" in the past decades, specific obstacles
still prevent the system from operating in an ideally humanitarian
manner. 173 Changes to United States asylum law after the attacks of
September 11, 2001 illustrate how national security concerns and
political motivations impact discriminatory policies against asylum
seekers from specific countries. Because the United States has failed to
adopt the Convention 's non-discrimination clause, 174 the government
can rely on the Convention's national security exception to
discriminate against refugees and asylum applicants based on country
of origin in times "of war or other grave and exceptional
circumstances."l75 For example, the REAL ID Act, enacted by
Congress in 2005, created the requirement that asylum seekers show
that their "race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion" represented one central reason for the
persecution that they experienced.176 This represented a change from
former requirements, which only required a showing that this belief
was one reason for the persecution.17 This shift in the language of the
law thereby presented a heightened standard for obtaining asylum. The
REAL ID Act also gave more discretionary power to immigration
judges and asylum officers to make credibility judgments.1 78 In
addition, the USA PATRIOT ACT, signed into law by former
President George W. Bush in 2001, broadened the category of

171. See id. at 230.
172. Id.
173. Swanwick, supra note 168, at 134-35 (internal citations omitted).
174. Convention, supra note 42, at art. 3 (requiring that member states "apply the
provisions of [the] Convention to refugees without discrimination as to race, religion or
country of origin").
175. Convention, supra note 42, at art. 9 (stipulating that "[n]othing in this Convention
shall prevent a Contracting State, in time of war or other grave and exceptional circumstances,
from taking provisionally measures which it considers to be essential to the national security
in the case of a particular person, pending a determination by the Contracting State that that
person is in fact a refugee and that the continuance of such measures is necessary in his case in
the interests of national security").
176. REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231, 303 (2005) (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1158).
177. See id.
178. Id. at § 101(d)(2) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)).
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inadmissible immigration applicants to include individuals involved in
terrorist organizations. 79
Based on an analysis of recent case law, it appears that the
BIA's "social visibility" standard represents another manner through
which asylum judges and officers can prevent legal protection to
individuals from countries that a pose national security threat to the
United States.
This requirement artificially constructs a legal
standard through which adjudicators can reject applicants based on
past persecutions from MS-13 and other Central American gangs.' 8 1
Since its inception, the "social visibility" has effectively blocked the
majority of Central American gang-based asylum claims in front of
both the BIA and federal circuit courts.182 Furthermore, as Judge
Posner pointed out in Gatimi, the BIA has selectively imposed the
"social visibility" standard to cases from Central America, while
ignoring the requirement when adjudicating asylum claims from other
regions of the world.' 8 3 As such, both the impact and the usage of
"social visibility" demonstrates how the availability of the standard
allows Courts to discriminates against applicants from El Salvador,
and other Central American countries, based on stated national
security concerns and political interests.18 4
This politicization of asylum adjudication permits the
immigration courts and asylum officers throughout the United States
to avoid their duties to those fleeing persecution, and specifically,
fleeing threats from MS-13 gang violence in Central America.
Deferring to the BIA authority, the Supreme Court also refuses to
address the issue.' 85 In the meantime, the courts are sending hundreds
of innocent individuals back to Central America where they face

179. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56,
115 Stat. 272, 345-50 (2001).
180. Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611, 615-16 (7th Cir. 2009) ("But regarding 'social
visibility' as a criterion for determining 'particular social group,' the Board has been
inconsistent rather than silent. It has found groups to be 'particular social groups' without
reference to social visibility . . . as well as, in this and other cases, refusing to classify socially
invisible groups as 'particular social groups' but without repudiating the other line of cases.
When an administrative agency's decisions are inconsistent, a court cannot pick one of the
inconsistent lines and defer to that one, unless only one is within the scope of the agency's
discretion to interpret the statutes it enforces or to make policy as Congress's delegate.")
(internal citations omitted).
18 1. Id.
182. Supra note 105.
183. Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611, 615-16 (7th Cir. 2009).
184. Id.; supra note 105.
185. Contreras-Martinez v. Holder, No. 09-830, 2010 U.S. LEXIS 3983, at *1 (2010).
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heightened threats to their life from MS-13 and M-18. 18 6 Despite the
presence of MS- 13 in the United States, MS- 13 related violence in this
country pales in comparison to the seriousness of the threat that these
individuals face upon return to their countries.' 87 The immigration
system's failure to carve a path to safety for those who have been
persecuted by gang violence thereby violates the United States' legal
obligations to provide safety to refugees and also directly contradicts
the Congressional purpose of entering into the Protocol and the
Convention.
VI. STRIKING A BALANCE AND FULFILLING OUR OBLIGATION

As illustrated in Part IV, the United States has thus far failed to
strike a workable balance between the country's national security
concerns and its commitment to bringing the United States into
compliance with the humanitarian and politically neutral goals of the
United Nations Protocol and Convention.189 Lawmakers instead
continue to rely on political influences to perpetuate biased asylum
laws that unfairly deny victims of persecution protection within our
borders.190 Among these victims are the thousands of young eople
fleeing MS-13 gang violence in Mexico and Central America.' The
United States must therefore take proactive steps to regain this balance
and fulfill its international obligation to these asylees.
The United States first must take responsibility for its role in
the creation of MS-13. Although government agencies define MS-13
as a gang of "Central and South American immigrants,"1 92 it is crucial
that the United States recognize that the gang was born out of Los
Angeles riots in the 1990's after toughened anti-gang laws resulted in
increased incarceration of young Latino men. 193 Taking a higher level
of responsibility for the origins of the gang would place an increased
liability on the immigration court system to provide safety to those
fleeing MS-13 violence and recruitment.

186. See Julia Preston, On Gangs, Asylum Law Offers Little, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2010,
at *Al6, available at http://www.nytimes.comi/2010/06/29/us/29asylum.htm.
187. Funes, supra note 10.
188. See I.N.S. v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 427 (1999).
189. See supra Part V.C.
190. See supra Part V.C.
191. See supra Part 1.
192. FBI, supra note 156.
193. Arana, supra note 19, at 100.
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In addition, the United States should honor the United Nations
Convention non-discriminatory provision when providing asylum and
refugee status to those fleeing persecution.' 94 Other member states that
have adopted the United Nations Convention have entered into treaties
calling for neutrality in immigration policies. For example, in 1984,
Latin American member states entered into the Cartagena Declaration
of Refugees, which acknowledged the "peaceful, non-political and
exclusively humanitarian nature of grant of asylum or recognition of
the status of refigee[s] . . ."'95 Additionally, both the Organization of
African Unity and the Council of Europe are signatories to treaties that
define asylum as a "humanitarian act." 1 96 The United States has failed
to enter into any of these treaties, thereby maintaining a uniquely
political relationship to the adjudication of asylum. Choosing to
become a party to these treaties would perhaps provide the United
States with a greater degree of accountability to the non-discriminatory
nature of the United Nations Convention.197
Finally, the BIA must reject the "social visibility" standard of
the particular social group. The BIA must acknowledge the Seventh
Circuit's analysis of the inconsistencies that exist among the BIA's
application of "social visibility" standards for respondents from
various countries. 198 The BIA should also consider the Seventh
Circuit's conclusion that this legal standard requires that a respondent
place himself or herself in heightened danger.199 Finally, asylum
adjudicators must recognize the UNHCR's conclusion that the BIA

194. Convention, supra note 42, at art. 3. ("The contracting parties shall apply the
provisions of this Convention to refugees without discrimination as to race, religion, or
country of origin.").
195. Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, art. III, T 4, Nov. 22, 1984 reprinted in 3
UNHCR, Collection of International Instruments and Legal Texts Concerning Refugees and
Others of Concern to UNHCR 1197 (2007).
196. Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problem in Africa, art. II,
June 20, 1974, 1000 U.N.T.S. 45 (stating that "the grant of asylum to refugees is a peaceful
and humanitarian act and shall not be regarded as an unfriendly act by any Member State");
EUR. PARL. Ass. DEB. 40th Sess.
1088 (Oct. 7,
1998), available at
http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/AdoptedText/ta88/EREC I088.htm
("[r]ecalling that granting the right to territorial asylum is a humanitarian act based on the
principles of political freedom and human rights").
197. Rapoport, supra note 166, at 232-33.
198. Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611, 615-16 (2009) (recognizing a line of cases in which
the BIA itself did not mention the social visibility standard when determining particular social
group).
199. Id. at 615 ("Those former employees of the Colombian attorney general tried hard,
one can be sure, to become invisible and, so far as appears, were unknown to Colombian
society as a whole.").
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misread the guidelines, and that there is no requirement that a
particular social group be visible to the society at large.2 00
Without the "social visibility" standard, the BIA and
immigration courts can assess gang-based asylum claims on a case-bycase basis. Asylum applicants already carry a high burden when
proving eligibility for asylum to the court and officers.201 Not only
must applicants illustrate past persecution and the inability to return to
their home countries,202 but the immigration court and asylum officers
can exercise the discretion to deny applications based on credibility. 203
These tools provide the immigration adjudicators sufficient
opportunity to deny applicants if the court deems that the applicant's
claim is fraudulent or if the applicant will pose a national security
threat by supporting MS-13 once granted asylum.
The BIA must turn its attention away from political interests
and back to the individual claims of those seeking assistance in court.
Approaching the asylum process in this way would allow the
immigration system to regain its balance, while fulfilling its obligation
to the international community and those seeking safety within our
country's borders.
VII. CONCLUSION

The BIA must carve out a path to asylum for the genuine
victims of gang violence in Central America. Despite the real threats
that the MS-13 pose within our borders, our immigration system has a
legal obligation to the international community to provide a secure
refuge to those fleeing violence and persecution. 204 In addition, the
courts have a well-established diplomatic duty, under the 1967
Protocol2 05 and 1951 Convention,20 to offer asylum to international
refugees. To balance these competing interests, lawmakers must take
responsibility for the United States' role in the creation and increased
strength of the MS-13 gang. 207 In addition, the BIA must reject the
200. UNHCR Brief supra note 108, at 13.
201. To establish a well-founded fear of future persecution the respondent must show (1)
he has a subjective fear of persecution and (2) that the fear has an objective basis. 8 U.S.C. §
1158(b)(1)(A) (2006).
202. Id. at § 1101(a)(42)(A).
203. Id. at § 1158 (b)(1)(B).
204. I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 436-37 (1987) (internal citations omitted);
I.N.S. v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 427 (1999).
205. Protocol,supra note 43.
206. Convention, supra note 42.
207. Arana, supra note 19, at 100-01.
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"social visibility" standard of the particular social group ground of
asylum as a legal fiction. Both the Seventh Circuit and the UNHCR
have demonstrated that the standard neither reflects the realistic
experiences of refugees, nor the UNHCR's own guidelines. 208

208. See supra Part III.

